activity
20092026
most citedOn the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

60 citations · 269 across the 42 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing 2017Show all

5 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2017★ 9 cited

On the Distortion of Voting with Multiple Representative Candidates

Yu Cheng, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe

We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In…

cs.GT2017★ 14 cited

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates

Yu Cheng, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe

In light of the classic impossibility results of Arrow and Gibbard and Satterthwaite regarding voting with ordinal rules, there has been recent interest in characterizing how well…

cs.GT2017

Combinatorial Auctions with Online XOS Bidders

Shaddin Dughmi, Bryan Wilder

In combinatorial auctions, a designer must decide how to allocate a set of indivisible items amongst a set of bidders. Each bidder has a valuation function which gives the utility…

cs.GT2017

Bernoulli Factories and Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design

Shaddin Dughmi, Jason Hartline, Robert Kleinberg +1

We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our…

cs.GT2017

Mitigating the Curse of Correlation in Security Games by Entropy Maximization

Haifeng Xu, Milind Tambe, Shaddin Dughmi +1

In Stackelberg security games, a defender seeks to randomly allocate limited security resources to protect critical targets from an attack. In this paper, we study a fundamental, y…