activity
20092026
most citedOn the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

60 citations · 269 across the 42 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing cs.GTShow all

30 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2024

Efficient Multi-Agent Delegated Search

Curtis Bechtel, Shaddin Dughmi

Consider a principal who wants to search through a space of stochastic solutions for one maximizing their utility. If the principal cannot conduct this search on their own, they ma…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

On Supermodular Contracts and Dense Subgraphs

Ramiro Deo-Campo Vuong, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel +1

We study the combinatorial contract design problem, introduced and studied by Dutting et. al. (2021, 2022), in both the single and multi-agent settings. Prior work has examined the…

cs.GT2022

Delegated Pandora's box

Curtis Bechtel, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel

In delegation problems, a principal does not have the resources necessary to complete a particular task, so they delegate the task to an untrusted agent whose interests may differ…

cs.GT2020

Delegated Stochastic Probing

Curtis Bechtel, Shaddin Dughmi

Delegation covers a broad class of problems in which a principal doesn't have the resources or expertise necessary to complete a task by themselves, so they delegate the task to an…

cs.GT2019

Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality

Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas +1

Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and a…

cs.GT2018

Alea Iacta Est: Auctions, Persuasion, Interim Rules, and Dice

Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe, Ruixin Qiang

To select a subset of samples or "winners" from a population of candidates, order sampling [Rosen 1997] and the k-unit Myerson auction [Myerson 1981] share a common scheme: assign…