4 papers
Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots
Federico Fioravanti, Zoi Terzopoulou
When voters evaluate alternatives sequentially, an anchoring bias makes their ballots depend on the order in which alternatives are presented. For approval ballots, no non-constant…
Anchor-proofness in Voting
Federico Fioravanti, Zoi Terzopoulou
We study how order-dependent individual evaluations affect collective decision-making. We consider a voting environment in which voters have intrinsic preference rankings and accep…
On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Federico Fioravanti
We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abs…
Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes
Ulle Endriss, Federico Fioravanti
In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those…