16 citations · 64 across the 32 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Constant-Competitive Prior-Free Auction with Ordered Bidders
Sayan Bhattacharya, Janardhan Kulkarni, Xiaoming Xu
A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are d…
Budget Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items
Sayan Bhattacharya, Gagan Goel, Sreenivas Gollapudi +1
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogene…
Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala +1
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budge…