activity
20022026
most citedMultidimensional reconciliation for continuous-variable quantum key distribution

244 citations · 983 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

18 papers

math.OC2026

Evaluating DV/CV-QKD Architectures for SAFE Long-Term Secure Storage: A Risk Model and ILP-Based Cost Optimization Approach

Alireza Tasdighi, Romain Alléaume

This paper presents a unified cost-modeling and optimization framework designed to evaluate hybrid discrete-variable/continuous-variable quantum key distribution (DV/CV-QKD) infras…

quant-ph2022★ 32 cited

Long-Range QKD without Trusted Nodes is Not Possible with Current Technology

Bruno Huttner, Romain Alléaume, Eleni Diamanti +11

A recently published patent (https://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-ipsum/Case/PublicationNumber/GB2590064) has claimed the development of a novel quantum key distribution protocol purporting to…

quant-ph2020

Experimental vulnerability analysis of QKD based on attack ratings

Rupesh Kumar, Francesco Mazzoncini, Hao Qin +1

Inspired by the methodology used for classical cryptographic hardware, we consider the use of attack ratings in the context of QKD security evaluation. To illustrate the relevance…

quant-ph2020★ 6 cited

Technology Trends for Mixed QKD/WDM Transmission up to 80 km

Romain Alléaume, Raphaël Aymeric, Cédric Ware +1

We give a survey of some of the recent progress made in deploying quantum and classical communications over a shared fiber, focusing in particular on results obtained using continu…

quant-ph2020★ 2 cited

Everlasting Secure Key Agreement with performance beyond QKD in a Quantum Computational Hybrid security model

Nilesh Vyas, Romain Alleaume

Extending the functionality and overcoming the performance limitation under which QKD can operate requires either quantum repeaters or new security models. Investigating the latter…

quant-ph2018★ 115 cited

Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution

Hao Qin, Rupesh Kumar, Vadim Makarov +1

We propose an efficient strategy to attack a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) system, that we call homodyne detector blinding. This attack strategy takes advan…