4 papers
Adaptive Bandit Algorithms for Contextual Matching Markets
Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Vianney Perchet +1
We study bandit learning in matching markets, where players and arms constitute the two market sides, and the players' utilities are linear in the arm contexts. In each round, new…
Complexity of Auctions with Interdependence
Patrick Loiseau, Simon Mauras, Minrui Xu
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the age…
Stable Matching with Ties: Approximation Ratios and Learning
Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Nadav Merlis +1
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided…
A Direct Proof of the Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets
Simon Mauras, Pawel Pralat, Adrian Vetta
We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a bala…