4 papers
Adaptive Bandit Algorithms for Contextual Matching Markets
Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Vianney Perchet +1
We study bandit learning in matching markets, where players and arms constitute the two market sides, and the players' utilities are linear in the arm contexts. In each round, new…
Bandit Learning in Housing Markets
Shiyun Lin
The housing market, also known as one-sided matching market, is a classic exchange economy model where each agent on the demand side initially owns an indivisible good (a house) an…
Stable Matching with Ties: Approximation Ratios and Learning
Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Nadav Merlis +1
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided…
Principal-Agent Problem with Third Party: Information Design from Social Planner's Perspective
Shiyun Lin, Zhihua Zhang
We study the principal-agent problem with a third party that we call social planner, whose responsibility is to reconcile the conflicts of interest between the two players and indu…