72 citations · 72 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Selling Complementary Goods: Dynamics, Efficiency and Revenue
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan
We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum…
Networks of Complements
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan
We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pair-wise complementarities between products. We study how the network structu…
(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mech…
Reallocation Mechanisms
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value…
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
L. Blumrosen, N. Nisan, I. Segal
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maxim…
Auctions with Online Supply
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Aaron L. Roth
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and…