3 papers
econ.TH2026
Equilibrium Architecture in Multi-Battle Contests with Count-Dependent Prizes
Zhonghong Kuang, Jingfeng Lu
We study how aggregating local victories shapes participation and equilibrium uniqueness. Two contestants with possibly different marginal costs compete across identical Tullock ba…
econ.TH2026
Dividing the Spoils: Strategic Prize Allocation in Team Contests
Zhonghong Kuang, Jingfeng Lu, Yiyao Zhu
Rival teams compete through battles and reward members only after team victory. We study how team managers allocate victory-contingent reward budgets across players to maximize the…
econ.TH2026
Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design
Siyuan Fan, Zhonghong Kuang, Jingfeng Lu
We study -dimensional Tullock contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs. We establish sharp bounds on discriminatory power ensuring that equilibrium is un…