5 papers · 1 filter
Scaling Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibrium Computation for Exclusive Resource-Assignment Games
Jaehan Im, Ufuk Topcu, David Fridovich-Keil
The chance-constrained correlated equilibrium concept provides a robust coordination technique for self-interested agents whose costs are uncertain to a central coordinator, but th…
Scalable Coordination with Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibria via Reduced-Rank Structure
Jaehan Im, David Fridovich-Keil, Ufuk Topcu
Chance-constrained correlated equilibrium enables coordination of noncooperative agents under cost uncertainty through probabilistic incentive-compatibility guarantees. However, co…
Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibria for Robust Noncooperative Coordination
Jaehan Im, Ufuk Topcu, David Fridovich-Keil
Correlated equilibria enable a coordinator to influence the self-interested agents by recommending actions that no player has an incentive to deviate from. However, the effectivene…
Noncooperative Coordination via a Trading-based Auction
Jaehan Im, Filippos Fotiadis, Daniel Delahaye +2
Noncooperative multi-agent systems often face coordination challenges due to conflicting preferences among agents. In particular, when agents act in their own self-interest, they m…
Coordination in Noncooperative Multiplayer Matrix Games via Reduced Rank Correlated Equilibria
Jaehan Im, Yue Yu, David Fridovich-Keil +1
Coordination in multiplayer games enables players to avoid the lose-lose outcome that often arises at Nash equilibria. However, designing a coordination mechanism typically require…