3 papers
econ.GN2026
Daycare Matching with Siblings: Social Implementation and Welfare Evaluation
Kan Kuno, Daisuke Moriwaki, Yoshihiro Takenami
In centralized matching markets, agents may value joint assignment, as with siblings or couples. Standard preference estimation ignores such complementarities, complicating welfare…
econ.GN2026
Buyer Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining: The Case of Online Japanese C2C Market
Kan Kuno
This paper studies bargaining when buyers can continue searching for alternative sellers while negotiating, which limits their commitment to complete a transaction. Using transacti…
econ.GN2023
Strategic Waiting in Centralized Matching: Daycare Assignment
Kan Kuno
In centralized assignment mechanisms, unassigned participants are often placed on waitlists to improve their chances in future rounds. However, I demonstrate that this practice may…