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20212026
most citedRisk sharing, measuring variability, and distortion riskmetrics

1 citations · 2 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

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econ.TH2026

Optimal robust comonotonic risk sharing under operational constraints

Carole Bernard, Christopher Blier-Wong, Jean-Gabriel Lauzier

Risk-sharing arrangements such as reinsurance programs and catastrophe pools must satisfy operational constraints, including capacity limits, attachment bands, retention rules and…

econ.TH2026

Designing entry-monotone risk-sharing pools

Christopher Blier-Wong, Jean-Gabriel Lauzier

While risk pooling lowers the total cost of risk, efficiency alone does not make a pool viable. Participants need terms that ensure their participation, that are immune to subgroup…

econ.TH2026

Comonotonic improvement under feasibility constraints

Christopher Blier-Wong, Jean-Gabriel Lauzier

Regulatory and contractual constraints on individual exposures are standard in insurance and reinsurance markets, but a poorly designed constraint can distort the economic incentiv…

econ.TH2024★ 1 cited

Optimal risk sharing, equilibria, and welfare with empirically realistic risk attitudes

Jean-Gabriel Lauzier, Liyuan Lin, Peter Wakker +1

This paper examines optimal risk sharing. It brings in empirical realism, reckoning with the risk seeking found empirically. We provide results on Pareto optimality, competitive eq…

econ.TH2021

Insurance design and arson-type risks

Jean-Gabriel Lauzier

We design the insurance contract when the insurer faces arson-type risks. The optimal contract must be manipulation-proof. It is therefore continuous, it has a bounded slope, and i…

econ.TH2021

Envelope theorem and discontinuous optimisation: the case of positioning choice problems

Jean-Gabriel Lauzier

This article examines differentiability properties of the value function of positioning choice problems, a class of optimisation problems in finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces. We…

econ.TH2021

Ex-post moral hazard and manipulation-proof contracts

Jean-Gabriel Lauzier

We examine the trade-off between the provision of incentives to exert costly effort (ex-ante moral hazard) and the incentives needed to prevent the agent from manipulating the prof…