5 papers
Stochastic Choice, Limited Attention, and Aggregation over Attributes
Arkarup Basu Mallik, Mihir Bhattacharya, Anuj Bhowmik
We study an attribute-based model of stochastic choice in which attention to each attribute is limited, and characterize two choice rules within it. The Multiplicative Attention Ru…
Strategy-Proof Set-Valued Choice on Single-Dipped Domains
Arkarup Basu Mallik, Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
We study strategy-proof social choice where agents have single-dipped preferences and outcomes may be sets of alternatives. While point-valued strategy-proof rules select an endpoi…
Envy-free, efficient and strategy-proof division of a heterogeneous good between two agents
Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
We study the division of between two agents, each receiving a closed subinterval, under ordinal preferences that need not be additive. A monotonic preference has a unique b…
A simple characterization of single-peaked domains
Mihir Bhattacharya, Anup Pramanik
This paper characterizes the single-peaked domain on a tree via the strategy-proofness of extreme rules defined on that tree. For any tree, these rules are unanimous and anonymous…
Stable Matching with Choice Correspondences: Beyond Path Independence
Varun Bansal, Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
We study stable matching with agents' choice correspondences as primitives. For many-to-many markets we introduce Individually Rational Persistence (IRP), which admits status-quo p…