2 citations · 2 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Universally truthful mechanisms for scheduling
Georgios Anastasiadis, George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias +2
We consider universally truthful randomized mechanisms for the problem of scheduling jobs on unrelated machines. We prove a lower bound on the expected approximation ratio…
A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamaria Kovacs
Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen conjectured that the best approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms for makespan-minimization for unrelated machines is . This work…
Truthful allocation in graphs and hypergraphs
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamaria Kovacs
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is…
On the Nisan-Ronen conjecture
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamaria Kovacs
The Nisan-Ronen conjecture states that no truthful mechanism for makespan-minimization when allocating tasks to unrelated machines can have approximation ratio less than $n…
On the Nisan-Ronen conjecture for submodular valuations
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamaria Kovacs
We consider incentive compatible mechanisms for a domain that is very close to the domain of scheduling unrelated machines: the single exception is that the valuation of just o…
Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First Price Auctions
George Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Alkmini Sgouritsa +1
We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions for buyers with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the Bayesian Price of An…