241 citations · 694 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for
24 papers
SCRAMBLE-CFI: Mitigating Fault-Induced Control-Flow Attacks on OpenTitan
Pascal Nasahl, Stefan Mangard
Secure elements physically exposed to adversaries are frequently targeted by fault attacks. These attacks can be utilized to hijack the control-flow of software allowing the attack…
SFP: Providing System Call Flow Protection against Software and Fault Attacks
Robert Schilling, Pascal Nasahl, Martin Unterguggenberger +1
With the improvements in computing technologies, edge devices in the Internet-of-Things have become more complex. The enabler technology for these complex systems are powerful appl…
EC-CFI: Control-Flow Integrity via Code Encryption Counteracting Fault Attacks
Pascal Nasahl, Salmin Sultana, Hans Liljestrand +5
Fault attacks enable adversaries to manipulate the control-flow of security-critical applications. By inducing targeted faults into the CPU, the software's call graph can be escape…
SCFI: State Machine Control-Flow Hardening Against Fault Attacks
Pascal Nasahl, Martin Unterguggenberger, Rishub Nagpal +3
Fault injection (FI) is a powerful attack methodology allowing an adversary to entirely break the security of a target device. As finite-state machines (FSMs) are fundamental hardw…
SYNFI: Pre-Silicon Fault Analysis of an Open-Source Secure Element
Pascal Nasahl, Miguel Osorio, Pirmin Vogel +4
Fault attacks are active, physical attacks that an adversary can leverage to alter the control-flow of embedded devices to gain access to sensitive information or bypass protection…
SERVAS! Secure Enclaves via RISC-V Authenticryption Shield
Stefan Steinegger, David Schrammel, Samuel Weiser +2
Isolation is a long-standing challenge of software security. Traditional privilege rings and virtual memory are more and more augmented with concepts such as capabilities, protecti…