4 papers
Obviously Strategy-proof Choice of Social Acts
Abinash Panda, Anup Pramanik
We study obviously strategy-proof implementation in the framework of social choice over acts introduced by Bahel and Sprumont (2020). We characterize the class of unanimous social…
A simple characterization of single-peaked domains
Mihir Bhattacharya, Anup Pramanik
This paper characterizes the single-peaked domain on a tree via the strategy-proofness of extreme rules defined on that tree. For any tree, these rules are unanimous and anonymous…
Local Strategy-proofness and Dictatorship
Abinash Panda, Anup Pramanik, Ragini Saxena
We investigate preference domains under which every unanimous and locally strategy-proof social choice function (scf) satisfies dictatorship. We identify a condition on domains cal…
Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default
Parikshit De, Abinash Panda, Anup Pramanik
We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indi…