3 papers
econ.TH2026
Obviously Strategy-proof Choice of Social Acts
Abinash Panda, Anup Pramanik
We study obviously strategy-proof implementation in the framework of social choice over acts introduced by Bahel and Sprumont (2020). We characterize the class of unanimous social…
econ.TH2026
Local Strategy-proofness and Dictatorship
Abinash Panda, Anup Pramanik, Ragini Saxena
We investigate preference domains under which every unanimous and locally strategy-proof social choice function (scf) satisfies dictatorship. We identify a condition on domains cal…
econ.TH2026
Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default
Parikshit De, Abinash Panda, Anup Pramanik
We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indi…