8 citations · 29 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2014★ 7 cited
Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets
Nima Anari, Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad
In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk, ClickWorker, CrowdFlower. In these market…
cs.GT2014★ 1 cited
Clinching Auctions Beyond Hard Budget Constraints
Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme
Constraints on agent's ability to pay play a major role in auction design for any setting where the magnitude of financial transactions is sufficiently large. Those constraints hav…