8 citations · 29 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 2 filters
Mechanism Design for Fair Division
Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collectio…
Clinching Auctions with Online Supply
Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme
Auctions for perishable goods such as internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without k…
Truthfulness, Proportional Fairness, and Efficiency
Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use mon…
Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the Adwords Polytope
Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme
A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible, ind…