5 papers
Strategic Heterogeneity: Welfare Gains from Secession and Immigration
Mauro Bambi, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan
This paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogen…
Public Information Generators: Common Knowledge and Information Loops
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with privately informed players. One oracle dominates another if, for every experiment of the la…
Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations
Ehud Lehrer, Dimitry Shaiderman
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, whil…
The Maxmin Value of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side and Tail-Measurable Payoffs
Gil Bar Castellon Koltun, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan
We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff).…
Constrained Mediation: Bayesian Implementability of Joint Posteriors
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We examine information structures in settings with privately informed agents and an informationally constrained mediator who supplies additional public signals. Our focus is on cha…