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cs.GT2026
Resourced Authority A Mechanism-Design Model for Participatory Governance of Deployed AI Agents
Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Ganesh Ghalme
We give a formal mechanism design model for the continuous participatory governance of a deployed AI agent. The mechanism is built on the principle that governance should control a…
cs.GT2026
Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information
Andra Siva Sai Teja, Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar
We study a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion problem with one receiver and several strategic senders. The underlying ground state has multiple components, each privately observed by…
cs.GT2025
On Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Abstention
Reshef Meir, Ganesh Ghalme
The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study…