3 papers
math.OC2026
A No-Regret Framework for Adaptive Incentive Design
Georgios Vasileiou, Lantian Zhang, Silun Zhang
Incentive design studies how a central authority can influence strategic agents through payments, subsidies, or taxes, so that individual objectives align with collective welfare.…
math.OC2026
Incentive Design without Hypergradients: A Social-Gradient Method
Georgios Vasileiou, Lantian Zhang, Silun Zhang
Incentive design problems consider a system planner who steers self-interested agents toward a socially optimal Nash equilibrium by issuing incentives in the presence of informatio…
math.OC2026
Adaptive Incentive Design with Regret Minimization
Georgios Vasileiou, Lantian Zhang, Silun Zhang
Incentive design constitutes a foundational paradigm for influencing the behavior of strategic agents, wherein a system planner (principal) publicly commits to an incentive mechani…