activity
20232026
most citedProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Constant-Time Policy (Extended version)

2 citations · 2 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

5 papers

cs.CR2026

SCHERI: Provably Secure Speculation Under the Constant-Time Policy for CHERI (Extended Version)

Shixin Song, Davide Davoli, Elias Storme +4

Capability-based architectures such as CHERI provide strong support for the architectural isolation of software components. To additionally protect against microarchitectural leaka…

cs.CR2026

dfence: Fine-Grained Speculation Barriers for Efficient and Effective Hardware-Software Protection in the Spectre Era (Extended Version)

Davide Davoli, Marton Bognar, Lesly-Ann Daniel +3

Speculative execution attacks such as Spectre-PHT and Spectre-STL remain a critical security concern in modern processors. While software-based mitigations like Speculative Load Ha…

cs.CR2024

Comprehensive Kernel Safety in the Spectre Era: Mitigations and Performance Evaluation (Extended Version)

Davide Davoli, Martin Avanzini, Tamara Rezk

The efficacy of address space layout randomization has been formally demonstrated in a shared-memory model by Abadi et al., contingent on specific assumptions about victim programs…

cs.CR2024

On Kernel's Safety in the Spectre Era (Extended Version)

Davide Davoli, Martin Avanzini, Tamara Rezk

The efficacy of address space layout randomization has been formally demonstrated in a shared-memory model by Abadi et al., contingent on specific assumptions about victim programs…

cs.CR2023★ 2 cited

ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Constant-Time Policy (Extended version)

Lesly-Ann Daniel, Marton Bognar, Job Noorman +3

We propose ProSpeCT, a generic formal processor model providing provably secure speculation for the constant-time policy. For constant-time programs under a non-speculative semanti…