4 papers
Equilibria and Learning in Competitive Market Making
Matteo Onger, Luigi Foscari
We propose a market-making game played among strategic market makers and a single non-strategic representative trader. In a continuous quote space, standard finite-game a…
Do Not Trust The Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctions
Luigi Foscari, Matilde Tullii, Vianney Perchet
Shilling is the use of artificial bids to make competition appear stronger and push prices upward. We study repeated first-price auctions in which shilling affects feedback but not…
The Invisible Handshake: Persistent Overpricing by Adaptive Market Agents
Luigi Foscari, Emanuele Guidotti, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi +2
We study overpricing in a repeated game between two representative agents: a market maker, who controls market liquidity, and a market taker, who chooses trade quantities. Market p…
Market Making without Regret
Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni +2
We consider a sequential decision-making setting where, at every round , a market maker posts a bid price and an ask price to an incoming trader (the taker) with a p…