4 papers
Auctions as Experiments
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii +1
Consider an auction with buyers whose values depend on an underlying state (e.g., market fundamentals). How does the auction format shape the information that buyers' bids reveal a…
Multidimensional Screening with Precise Seller Information
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple…
Monitoring with Rich Data
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich monitoring data about an agent's action. Rather than focusing on optimal contracts (which are known to in gen…
Robust Aggregation of Correlated Information
Henrique de Oliveira, Yuhta Ishii, Xiao Lin
An agent makes decisions based on multiple sources of information. In isolation, each source is well understood, but their correlation is unknown. We study the agent's robustly opt…