3 papers
econ.TH2026
Contagious Ambiguity
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Daisuke Oyama
We study the strategic impact of ambiguity through the channel of higher-order beliefs. We show that even small amounts of prior ambiguity about game payoffs can generate arbitrari…
econ.TH2024
Multidimensional Screening with Precise Seller Information
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple…
econ.TH2023
Monitoring with Rich Data
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich monitoring data about an agent's action. Rather than focusing on optimal contracts (which are known to in gen…