5 papers
Auctions as Experiments
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii +1
Consider an auction with buyers whose values depend on an underlying state (e.g., market fundamentals). How does the auction format shape the information that buyers' bids reveal a…
Contagious Ambiguity
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Daisuke Oyama
We study the strategic impact of ambiguity through the channel of higher-order beliefs. We show that even small amounts of prior ambiguity about game payoffs can generate arbitrari…
Multidimensional Screening with Precise Seller Information
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple…
Monitoring with Rich Data
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich monitoring data about an agent's action. Rather than focusing on optimal contracts (which are known to in gen…
Protection of SVM Model with Secret Key from Unauthorized Access
Ryota Iijima, AprilPyone MaungMaung, Hitoshi Kiya
In this paper, we propose a block-wise image transformation method with a secret key for support vector machine (SVM) models. Models trained by using transformed images offer a poo…