4 citations · 4 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
From Design to Disclosure
S. Nageeb Ali, Andreas Kleiner, Kun Zhang
This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's d…
Testing Experts Who Can Learn
Mark Whitmeyer, Kun Zhang
We show that when expertise lies not in what one initially knows but in the ability to acquire information and thereby refine beliefs, prediction-based contracts can distinguish ex…
Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure
Mark Whitmeyer, Kun Zhang
A sender flexibly acquires evidence--which she may pay a third party to certify--to disclose to a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence g…
Withholding Verifiable Information
Denis Shishkin, Maria Titova, Kun Zhang
We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. Whi…
Buying Opinions
Mark Whitmeyer, Kun Zhang
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the p…