3 papers
econ.TH2026
Reduced Forms: Feasibility, Extremality, Optimality
Pasha Andreyanov, Ilia Krasikov, Alex Suzdaltsev
We study independent private values auction settings with heterogeneous bidders, revenue nonlinear in interim winning probabilities, and place no ad hoc restrictions on auctions th…
econ.TH2024
Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design
Pasha Andreyanov, Ilia Krasikov, Alex Suzdaltsev
We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the class…
econ.EM2021
Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in first-price auctions
Pasha Andreyanov, Grigory Franguridi
In a classical model of the first-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values, we develop nonparametric estimators for several policy-relevant targets, such as the bid…