3 papers
econ.TH2024
Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments
Nadia Guiñazú, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We f…
econ.TH2024
Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of…
econ.TH2024
A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choice functions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associated one-to-one market.…