2 citations · 5 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
BayesL: a Logical Framework for the Verification of Bayesian Networks
Stefano M. Nicoletti, E. Moritz Hahn, Mariëlle Stoelinga
Modern explainable AI still struggles with a fundamental gap: although Bayesian networks (BNs) provide transparent probabilistic structure, there is no unified way to formally expr…
WATCHDOG: an ontology-aWare risk AssessmenT approaCH via object-oriented DisruptiOn Graphs
Stefano M. Nicoletti, E. Moritz Hahn, Mattia Fumagalli +2
When considering risky events or actions, we must not downplay the role of involved objects: a charged battery in our phone averts the risk of being stranded in the desert after a…
Tools at the Frontiers of Quantitative Verification
Roman Andriushchenko, Alexander Bork, Carlos E. Budde +20
The analysis of formal models that include quantitative aspects such as timing or probabilistic choices is performed by quantitative verification tools. Broad and mature tool suppo…
Querying Fault and Attack Trees: Property Specification on a Water Network
Stefano M. Nicoletti, Milan Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg, E. Moritz Hahn +1
We provide an overview of three different query languages whose objective is to specify properties on the highly popular formalisms of fault trees (FTs) and attack trees (ATs). The…
ATM: a Logic for Quantitative Security Properties on Attack Trees
Stefano M. Nicoletti, Milan Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg, E. Moritz Hahn +1
Critical infrastructure systems - for which high reliability and availability are paramount - must operate securely. Attack trees (ATs) are hierarchical diagrams that offer a flexi…