25 citations · 40 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary
Simone Di Gregorio, Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco +1
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a prof…
Autobidding Equilibria in Sponsored Shopping
Paul Dütting, Yuhao Li, Renato Paes Leme +2
As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic ``Sponsored Search", where an advertiser typ…
Nearly Tight Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade
Simone Di Gregorio, Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco +1
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this…
Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Paul Dütting +1
Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for ex…
Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Orchestrating AI Agents with Contracts
Dima Ivanov, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +2
The increasing deployment of AI is shaping the future landscape of the internet, which is set to become an integrated ecosystem of AI agents. Orchestrating the interaction among AI…
When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
In the combinatorial-action contract model (Dütting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given se…
Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Yingkai Li +1
We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effor…