3 papers
econ.TH2026
Filling Positions Without Transfers: Screening on Outside Options
Morteza Honarvar, Joanna Krysta, Eric Tang
A designer offers vertically-differentiated positions to agents in the absence of transfers. Agents have private outside options and may reject their offers ex-post. The designer h…
econ.TH2025
Private From Whom? A Privacy Frontier for Auctions
Eric Gao, Eric Tang
In many auctions, bidders may value keeping their information private from the auctioneer and other bidders. Among deterministic bilateral communication protocols, revealing less i…
econ.TH2025
Cued to Queue: Information in Waiting-Line Auctions
Jack Hirsch, Eric Tang
We study the effect of providing information to agents who queue before a scarce good is distributed at a fixed time. Many information policies reveal "sudden bad news," when agent…