3 papers
econ.TH2025
Divide and Confer: Aggregating Information without Verification
James Best, Daniel Quigley, Maryam Saeedi +1
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an…
econ.TH2025
Good Data and Bad Data: The Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination
Maryam Farboodi, Nima Haghpanah, Ali Shourideh
We study how a monopolist's use of consumer data for price discrimination affects welfare. To answer this question, we develop a model of market segmentation subject to residual un…
econ.TH2024
Getting the Agent to Wait
Maryam Saeedi, Yikang Shen, Ali Shourideh
We examine the strategic interaction between an expert (principal) maximizing engagement and an agent seeking swift information. Our analysis reveals: When priors align, relative p…