4 papers
Contracting for LLM Delegation: Moral Hazard in Technology and Effort Choice
Nanda Kishore Sreenivas, Kate Larson
We extend the standard Principal-Agent framework to scenarios where the Agent selects from a suite of technologies, each characterized by a distinct cost-capability profile. This f…
Curated Synthetic Data Doesn't Have to Collapse: A Theoretical Study of Generative Retraining with Pluralistic Preferences
Ali Falahati, Mohammad Mohammadi Amiri, Kate Larson +1
Recursive retraining of generative models poses a critical representation challenge: when synthetic outputs are curated based on a fixed reward signal, the model tends to collapse…
Information and Contract Design for Repeated Interactions between Agents with Misaligned Incentives
Nanda Kishore Sreenivas, Kate Larson
We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vit…
Nash without Numbers: A Social Choice Approach to Mixed Equilibria in Context-Ordinal Games
Ian Gemp, Crystal Qian, Marc Lanctot +1
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally…