1 citations · 1 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Roommates with Convex Preferences
Sophie Bade
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roomma…
Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-sided Matching
Sophie Bade, Joseph Root
We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which…
Fairness for Multi-Self Agents
Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-Halevi
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete…
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness
Sophie Bade, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much…