collaborators

9 papers

cs.GT2026

Simultaneous EF1 and approximate MMS allocations for submodular valuations

Uriel Feige, Assaf Fine

There are two common classes of fairness notions that are considered when allocating indivisible items to agents of equal entitlements. One is that of share-based fairness…

cs.GT2026

On MMS, APS and XOS

Uriel Feige, Vadim Grinberg

We consider allocations of a set of indivisible goods to agents of equal entitlements that have valuations from the class XOS. A previous sequence of works showed allocatio…

cs.GT2026

Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms for MMS Approximation

Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige, Noam Manaker Morag

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuations. Motivated by impossibility results for deterministic truthful mechanisms, we focus on…

cs.DS2025

Large cliques and large independent sets: can they coexist?

Uriel Feige, Ilia Pauzner

For a graph and a parameter , we call a vertex -enabling if it belongs both to a clique of size and to an independent set of size , and we call it -excluding ot…

cs.GT2025

The residual maximin share

Uriel Feige

We consider fair allocations of indivisible goods to agents with general monotone valuations. We observe that it is useful to introduce a new share-based fairness notion, the {\em…

cs.GT2025

From multi-allocations to allocations, with subadditive valuations

Uriel Feige

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents with monotone subadditive valuations. For integer , a -multi-allocation is an allocati…