activity
20242026
collaborators

6 papers

math.OC2026

Partially Observed Mean Field Games Without Perfect Recall: Optimality Conditions and Equilibria

Xuanping Zhang, Xiao Zhang, Wang Yao

This paper studies partially observed mean field games without perfect recall (WPR). The representative agent observes a noisy signal, but the control at time \(t\) uses only \(\ma…

math.OC2025

Initial Error Tolerant Distributed Mean Field Control under Partial and Discrete Information

Yuxin Jin, Haotian Wang, Wang Yao +1

In this paper, an initial error tolerant distributed mean field control method under partial and discrete information is introduced, where each agent only has discrete observations…

cs.LG2025

PIONM: A Generalized Approach to Solving Density-Constrained Mean-Field Games Equilibrium under Modified Boundary Conditions

Jinwei Liu, Wang Yao, Xiao Zhang

Neural network-based methods are effective for solving equilibria in Mean-Field Games (MFGs), particularly in high-dimensional settings. However, solving the coupled partial differ…

cs.LG2025

A Constraint-Preserving Neural Network Approach for Solving Mean-Field Games Equilibrium

Jinwei Liu, Lu Ren, Wang Yao +1

Neural network-based methods have demonstrated effectiveness in solving high-dimensional Mean-Field Games (MFG) equilibria, yet ensuring mathematically consistent density-coupled e…

math.OC2024

Linear Quadratic Mean Field Games under Heterogeneous Erroneous Initial Information

Yuxin Jin, Lu Ren, Wang Yao +1

We study a finite-horizon linear--quadratic mean field game with heterogeneous observations of the initial mean field. These observations may be erroneous and are used by agents to…

math.OC2024

Social optimum of finite mean field games: existence and uniqueness of equilibrium solutions in the finite horizon and stationary solutions in the infinite horizon

Zijia Niu, Sanjin Huang, Lu Ren +2

In this paper, we consider the social optimal problem of discrete time finite state space mean field games (referred to as finite mean field games [1]). Unlike the individual optim…