1 citations · 1 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Reconfiguration in Fair Division Revisited
Fabian Frank, Warut Suksompong
We revisit reconfiguration in the fair allocation of indivisible goods, where the goal is to transform one fair allocation into another through a sequence of exchanges while preser…
A Constant Metric Distortion Protocol for Approval Voting Given Plurality Polls
Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters
Approval voting is a simple and well-regarded voting rule: voters submit approval ballots (subsets of the candidates) and the candidate receiving the most approvals wins. One major…
An improved bound for the randomized metric distortion problem
Fabian Frank
We propose a randomized social choice rule called Mixed Integrated Veto (MIV) with metric distortion of , improving the previous best upper bound of . MIV is the equa…
A Polynomial-Time Rule Satisfying Full Justified Representation
Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters submit an approval ballot on which basis a committee of fixed size has to be selected. Compared to single-winner voting this makes…
Fractional Pareto-Optimality in Multiwinner Voting
Patrick Becker, Niclas Boehmer, Fabian Frank +1
Efficiency in multiwinner voting is most naturally captured by Pareto-optimality (PO), yet this notion is computationally and structurally difficult to handle. We therefore study f…
Stability Under Valuation Updates in Coalition Formation
Fabian Frank, Matija Novaković, René Romen
Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions under consideration of their preferences. We study the classical objective of stability in a v…
On Minimal Achievable Quotas in Multiwinner Voting
Patrick Becker, Fabian Frank
Justified representation (JR) and extended justified representation (EJR) are well-established proportionality axioms in approval-based multiwinner voting. Both axioms are always s…
Reconfiguring Proportional Committees
Chris Dong, Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters +1
An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees,…
The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations
Fabian Frank, Patrick Lederer
The metric distortion of a randomized social choice function (RSCF) quantifies its worst-case approximation ratio to the optimal social cost when the voters' costs for alternatives…