3 papers
econ.TH2026
Auction Design with a Bit of Information
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Shahr Dobzinski Jacob D. Leshno +2
Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying…
cs.GT2026
Welfare Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Improved Approximation Guarantees Beyond the Fixed Price Barrier
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
We study the setting of welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where the values of both the buyer and the seller are drawn from independent distributions. Our goal is to maximize…
cs.GT2025
Interdependent Bilateral Trade: Information vs Approximation
Shahar Dobzinski, Alon Eden, Kira Goldner +2
Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the privat…