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20242026
most citedEgalitarian Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods

2 citations · 2 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

5 papers

cs.DC2026

Predictions Can Only Help! Communication Efficient Byzantine Agreement with Predictions

Marc Dufay, Muhammad Ayaz Dzulfikar, Seth Gilbert

In Byzantine agreement with predictions each process begins with an input value and some (unreliable) prediction bits. Recently, it has been shown that with \emph{classification pr…

cs.DC2025

Byzantine Agreement with Predictions

Naama Ben-David, Muhammad Ayaz Dzulfikar, Faith Ellen +1

In this paper, we study the problem of \emph{Byzantine Agreement with predictions}. Along with a proposal, each process is also given a prediction, i.e., extra information which is…

cs.DC2024

Efficient Signature-Free Validated Agreement

Pierre Civit, Muhammad Ayaz Dzulfikar, Seth Gilbert +4

Byzantine agreement enables n processes to agree on a common L-bit value, despite up to t > 0 arbitrary failures. A long line of work has been dedicated to improving the bit comple…

cs.GT20242 cited

Egalitarian Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods

Karen Frilya Celine, Muhammad Ayaz Dzulfikar, Ivan Adrian Koswara

In the context of fair division, the concept of price of fairness has been introduced to quantify the loss of welfare when we have to satisfy some fairness condition. In other word…

cs.DC2024

Partial Synchrony for Free? New Upper Bounds for Byzantine Agreement

Pierre Civit, Muhammad Ayaz Dzulfikar, Seth Gilbert +4

Byzantine agreement allows n processes to decide on a common value, in spite of arbitrary failures. The seminal Dolev-Reischuk bound states that any deterministic solution to Byzan…