◍wovepaper
SearchResearchersInstitutions
Sign in
researcher

T. Walsh

142 papers hereh-index 7120.4k citations493 works total

Matching runs newest-first, so older work may not be attached to this profile yet.

author position
  • sole author35
  • middle author7
  • last author98

Across the 140 of 142 papers where every author was matched, so the position is known.

fields
  • cs.AI92
  • cs.GT35
  • cs.LO5
  • cs.CC2
  • cs.CY2
  • cs.DL2
same name
  • T. Walsh — 3 papers, h 13
  • T. Walsh — 3 papers, h 17
  • T. Walsh — 2 papers, h 44
  • T. Walsh — 2 papers, h 25
  • T. Walsh — 1 paper, h 2
  • T. Walsh — 1 paper, h 0

Either other researchers who publish under this name, or the same person where the external sources have not merged their records.

identity via Semantic Scholar / OpenAlex

activity
19932023
most citedSymmetry Breaking Using Value Precedence

201 citations · 1.5k across the 125 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing 2013 · cs.AIShow all

4 papers · 2 filters

cs.AI2013★ 2 cited

Breaking Symmetry with Different Orderings

Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh

We can break symmetry by eliminating solutions within each symmetry class. For instance, the Lex-Leader method eliminates all but the smallest solution in the lexicographical order…

cs.AI2013★ 6 cited

Coalitional Manipulation for Schulze's Rule

Serge Gaspers, Thomas Kalinowski, Nina Narodytska +1

Schulze's rule is used in the elections of a large number of organizations including Wikimedia and Debian. Part of the reason for its popularity is the large number of axiomatic pr…

cs.AI2013★ 2 cited

How Hard Is It to Control an Election by Breaking Ties?

Nicholas Mattei, Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh

We study the computational complexity of controlling the result of an election by breaking ties strategically. This problem is equivalent to the problem of deciding the winner of a…

cs.AI2013★ 2 cited

Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Convergence and Condorcet Efficiency

Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, Francesca Rossi +2

In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative…

◍wovepaper

Papers, researchers and institutions, woven together.

Explore
  • Search
  • Researchers
  • Institutions
Account
  • Library
  • Chat
Data
  • arXiv.org
  • Semantic Scholar
  • OpenAlex
  • Latest RSS
AboutContactPrivacyDevelopersllms.txtopenapi.json
Not affiliated with arXiv. Researcher data from Semantic Scholar (ODC-BY) and OpenAlex.