166 citations · 587 across the 57 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Breaking Symmetry with Different Orderings
Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh
We can break symmetry by eliminating solutions within each symmetry class. For instance, the Lex-Leader method eliminates all but the smallest solution in the lexicographical order…
A Social Welfare Optimal Sequential Allocation Procedure
Thomas Kalinowski, Nina Nardoytska, Toby Walsh
We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and indepen…
Coalitional Manipulation for Schulze's Rule
Serge Gaspers, Thomas Kalinowski, Nina Narodytska +1
Schulze's rule is used in the elections of a large number of organizations including Wikimedia and Debian. Part of the reason for its popularity is the large number of axiomatic pr…
How Hard Is It to Control an Election by Breaking Ties?
Nicholas Mattei, Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh
We study the computational complexity of controlling the result of an election by breaking ties strategically. This problem is equivalent to the problem of deciding the winner of a…
Global SPACING Constraint (Technical Report)
Nina Narodytska, Peter Skocovsky, Toby Walsh
We propose a new global SPACING constraint that is useful in modeling events that are distributed over time, like learning units scheduled over a study program or repeated patterns…
Possible and Necessary Winner Problem in Social Polls
Serge Gaspers, Victor Naroditskiy, Nina Narodytska +1
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents…