3 papers
cs.GT2026
Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games
Giulio Salizzoni, Domenico Mergoni Cecchelli, Edward Plumb +2
While infinitely repeated games admit a rich set of Nash equilibria, finitely repeated games typically have a much smaller and often inefficient one. We show how to enlarge this se…
cs.GT2025
Simultaneous Best-Response Dynamics in Random Potential Games
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Domenico Mergoni Cecchelli, Edward Plumb
This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games w…
cs.GT2024
The Bounds of Algorithmic Collusion; -learning, Gradient Learning, and the Folk Theorem
Galit Askenazi-Golan, Domenico Mergoni Cecchelli, Edward Plumb +1
We explore the behaviour emerging from learning agents repeatedly interacting strategically for a wide range of learning dynamics, including -learning, projected gradient, repli…