activity
20092026
most citedReport on the NSF Workshop on Formal Methods for Security

25 citations · 79 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

15 papers

cs.CR2026

Designing Trustworthy Layered Attestations

Will Thomas, Logan Schmalz, Adam Petz +4

Attestation means providing evidence that a remote target system is worthy of trust for some sensitive interaction. Although attestation is already used in network access control,…

cs.CR2024

Cryptographically Assured Information Flow: Assured Remote Execution

Scott L. Dyer, Christian A. Femrite, Joshua D. Guttman +2

Assured Remote Execution on a device is the ability of suitably authorized parties to construct secure channels with known processes -- i.e. processes executing known code -- runni…

cs.CR2023

Molly: A Verified Compiler for Cryptoprotocol Roles

Daniel J. Dougherty, Joshua D. Guttman

Molly is a program that compiles cryptographic protocol roles written in a high-level notation into straight-line programs in an intermediate-level imperative language, suitable fo…

cs.CR2018

Homomorphisms and Minimality for Enrich-by-Need Security Analysis

Daniel J. Dougherty, Joshua D. Guttman, John D. Ramsdell

Cryptographic protocols are used in different environments, but existing methods for protocol analysis focus only on the protocols, without being sensitive to assumptions about the…

cs.CR2018★ 1 cited

Enrich-by-need Protocol Analysis for Diffie-Hellman (Extended Version)

Moses D. Liskov, Joshua D. Guttman, John D. Ramsdell +2

Enrich-by-need protocol analysis is a style of symbolic protocol analysis that characterizes all executions of a protocol that extend a given scenario. In effect, it computes a str…

cs.CR2016★ 25 cited

Report on the NSF Workshop on Formal Methods for Security

Stephen Chong, Joshua Guttman, Anupam Datta +5

Report on the NSF Workshop on Formal Methods for Security, held 19-20 November 2015.