Showing cs.GTShow all
3 papers · 1 filter
cs.GT2026
Generalized Prophet Inequalities for Online Auctions
Twan Kroll, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Prophet Inequalities for online auctions, as many classical auction settings, traditionally consider agents who strive to maximize quasi-linear utility, i.e. their obtained value m…
cs.GT2026
Tight Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Auctions with Budgets via LP Duality
Twan Kroll, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis
We study the efficiency of auctions with budget-constrained bidders and derive tight price of anarchy (PoA) bounds for coarse correlated equilibria (CCE). To this end, we develop a…
cs.GT2025
Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll +3
Online advertising systems have recently transitioned to autobidding, allowing advertisers to delegate bidding decisions to automated agents. Each advertiser directs their agent to…