3 papers
econ.TH2026
Prophet Inequalities via Linear Programming
Halil I. Bayrak, Mustafa Ç. Pınar, Rakesh Vohra
Prophet inequalities bound the expected reward that can be obtained in a stopping problem by the optimal reward of its corresponding off-line version. We propose a systematic techn…
econ.TH2025
Distributionally Robust Contract Design with Deferred Inspection
Halil I. Bayrak, Martin Bichler
We study a robust contract design problem with deferred inspection, in which a principal allocates a scarce resource to an agent, observes the agent's realized outcome ex post at n…
econ.TH2022
Distributionally Robust Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
Halil İbrahim Bayrak, Çağıl Koçyiğit, Daniel Kuhn +1
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to cre…