4 papers
Nash Equilibria in Auctions with Pacing Strategies: Complexity and Inefficiency
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Charalampos Kokkalis, Mohamad Latifian
We introduce and study Auctions with Pacing Strategies (APS) games, a full-information model in which utility-maximizing bidders compete across many simultaneous first-price auctio…
Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Symmetric First-Price Auctions
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender +1
We study the complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in single-item first-price auctions. We present the first efficient algorithms for the problem, when the bidders' values…
Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender +1
We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly corre…
On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender +1
We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subject…