3 papers
cs.GT2025
Longer Lists Yield Better Matchings
Yuri Faenza, Aapeli Vuorinen
Many centralized mechanisms for two-sided matching markets that enjoy strong theoretical properties assume that the planner solicits full information on the preferences of each par…
math.OC2025
Minimum Cut Representability of Stable Matching Problems
Yuri Faenza, Ayoub Foussoul, Chengyue He
We introduce and study Minimum Cut Representability, a framework to solve optimization and feasibility problems over stable matchings by representing them as minimum s-t cut proble…
cs.DM2024
Scarf's Algorithm on Arborescence Hypergraphs
Karthekeyan Chandrasekaran, Yuri Faenza, Chengyue He +1
Scarf's algorithm--a pivoting procedure that finds a dominating extreme point in a down-monotone polytope--can be used to show the existence of a fractional stable matching in hype…