1 citations · 1 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
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School Choice with Appeals
Claudia Cerrone, Yoan Hermstrüwer, Josué Ortega
Roughly fifty thousand families in England appeal their school assignments each year through a centralized and understudied procedure that improves the placement of about one in fi…
Asymptotic Equivalence of Immediate and Deferred Acceptance
Josue Ortega
Immediate Acceptance (IA, also known as the Boston mechanism) is commonly used to assign students to schools because it produces a Pareto-efficient matching if parents report their…
Justifiable Priority Violations
Josué Ortega, R. Pablo Arribillaga
Making Deferred Acceptance more efficient requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? We argue that a priority can be justifiably violated if the affected student…
The Distribution of Envy in Matching Markets
Josué Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
We study the distribution of envy in random matching markets under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using tools from applied probability, we compute the expected number of p…
What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have…
The Trade-off Between Minimal Instability and Larger Improvements over Deferred Acceptance
Taylor Knipe, Josue Ortega
The celebrated Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism (EADA) improves the efficiency of the DA algorithm via consented priority violations. Notwithstanding its many meri…
The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
We prove that any stable matching mechanism suffers from systematic inefficiency of striking magnitude: in large random markets, any stable allocation is Pareto-inefficient with hi…