10 papers
Ex-Post Equilibria: Structure and Computation
Francesco Giordano, Julien Grand-Clément, Christian Kroer
This paper studies ex-post equilibria (EPEs) in simultaneous-move games with parameter uncertainty. We first compare EPEs with existing notions of robust equilibrium and provide a…
Dynamic Programming for Epistemic Uncertainty in Markov Decision Processes
Axel Benyamine, Julien Grand-Clément, Julien Grand-Clément +3
In this paper, we propose a general theory of ambiguity-averse MDPs, which treats the uncertain transition probabilities as random variables and evaluates a policy via a risk measu…
Thresholds for sensitive optimality and Blackwell optimality in stochastic games
Stéphane Gaubert, Julien Grand-Clément, Ricardo D. Katz
We investigate refinements of the mean-payoff criterion in two-player zero-sum perfect-information stochastic games. A strategy is Blackwell optimal if it is optimal in the discoun…
Playing against a stationary opponent
Julien Grand-Clément, Nicolas Vieille
This paper investigates properties of Blackwell -optimal strategies in zero-sum stochastic games when the adversary is restricted to stationary strategies, motivated by applica…
On Separation Between Best-Iterate, Random-Iterate, and Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games
Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément +4
Non-ergodic convergence of learning dynamics in games is widely studied recently because of its importance in both theory and practice. Recent work (Cai et al., 2024) showed that a…
Last-Iterate Convergence Properties of Regret-Matching Algorithms in Games
Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément +4
We study last-iterate convergence properties of algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum games based on Regret Matching (RM). Despite their widespread use for solving rea…